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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
December 6, 1985, Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 85-755-ASX 
DELYNDA ANN RICKER BARKE 
(illegitimate child s 
share of father's estate 
v. 
PRINCESS ANN RICKER 
(administratrix o 
Ricker's estate) 
from Tx. Ct. App. 
Osborn, Schulte) 
State/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appt raises a number of claims challenging 
a take nothing judgment rendered against her in her suit seeking 
to share in her father's intestate estate, including an argument 
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that '!·x. Ct. App. erred in refusing to apply Trimble v. Gordon, 
430 u.s. 672 (1977), retroactively. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Appt claims to be the 
illegitimate child of Prince Ricker, who died intestate in 1976. -------------Appee is adminstratrix of Prince's estate. In 1976, §42 of Tx. -Probate Code provided that, while illegitimate children could .__ __ ___..., 
inherit from their mothers, they could not inherit from their ~ ------ _____...,_ _______ __ 
fathers unless they were legitimated by a later marriage between r~ 
father and mother. In 1977, ~imble v. Gordon, 430 u.s. 672 
(1977), invalidated an Illinois statute that allowed 
illegitimates to take from their mothers but not from their fa-
ther s. Under the statute in Trimble, an illegitimate could be 
legitimated only if his parents later married each other and his 
(J...-t_ 
father acknowledged him. Following 'I'rimble,~exas amended §42 to 
~-~ 
provide that an illegitimate child could inherit from his father
if (1) he was born or conceived before or during the marriage of7~ 
his father and mother, (2) he was legitimized by court decree as 
provided in Chap. 13 of the '!'x. Family Code, or (3) his father 
executed a statement of paternity. 
At the time of Prince's death, Tx. Fam. Code §13.01 pro-
vided that a paternity suit was barred unless brought before the 
child was one year old. This version of §13.01 was invalidated 
by this Court. \./"Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 u.s. 91 (1982). Ulti-
rnately, the section was amended in 1983 to provide that a pater-
nity action must be brought on or before the second anniversary 
of the day the child becomes an adult. 
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In 1979, appt filed an application to determine heir-
ship, contending that she was the legitimate child of Prince and 
was entitled to inherit from his estate. Appee and four other 
children of Prince's three marriages claimed to be Prince's only 
~ 
heirs at law. A jury found that appt was Prince's child but that 
Prince and appt 's mother had never been legally married. The 
jury's findings also indicated that Prince and appt's mother did 
not have a "common law" marriage. Based on these findings, the - -~
TC entered a "take-nothing" judgment against appt, apparently 
applying the version of §42 in effect at the time of Prince's 
~· 
Appt appealed to Tx. Ct. App. Unfortunately, that 
court's opinion is not clear. One of appt 's arguments, as de-
scribed in the opinion, was that she was "entitled to inherit 
since to provide otherwise" would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. Tx. Ct. App. rejected that argument on the ground that 
trimble had not "been applied retroactively where the father died 
before [Trimble) came down and suit was filed afterwards." App. 
at 9. The court went on to say that, even if appt "could claim 
under Section 42 (b) as amended, her exclusion from the inheri-
tance under that statute does not deny her constitutional equal 
protection since a rational state basis supports that legisla-
tion." See Davis v. Jones, 626 S.W.2d 303 (Tx. 1982). 
Tx. Sup. Ct. denied review. 
3. CONTENTIONS: First, appt contends that Tx. Ct. App. 
erred in declining to apply Trimble retroactively. Appt identi-
fies a number of lower court decisions that do apply Trimble to 
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an heirship claim in an open estate of a decedent who died 
following the decision in Trimble. E.g., Gross v. Harris, 664 
F.2d 667 (CA8 1981) (illegitimate seeking social security bene-
fits); Nagle v. Wood, 178 Conn. 180 (1979); Easley v. John Han-
cock Mutual Life, 271 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1978); In re Estate of 
Burris, 361 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1978). Appt also points out that the 
cases have not been consistent in the analysis used to decide 
whether or not to give Trimble retrospective effect. In appt's 
view, the better reasoned dec is ions follow the test laid out in 
Chevron v. Huson, 404 u.s. 97 (1971). 
Second, appt argues that Tx. Ct. App. 's decision con-
flicts with Pickett v. Brown, 462 u.s. 1 (1983), which held that 
illegitimate children must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
establish paternity and which invalidated a statute imposing a 
two-year statute of limitations on paternity actions. Since appt 
was born before the effective date of Tx. Fam. Code §13.01, which 
created the legitimation action, she had no opportunity to satis-
fy §47 (b). Moreover, the action of the lower courts is wholly 
arbitrary because the jury found that appt was Prince's daughter. 
That finding fully satisfies the proof requirements erected by 
§4 7 (b) • 
Third, appt argues that the challenged statutes embody 
an unconstitutional sex-based classification because maternal 
heirship can be established by a preponderance of the evidence 
while paternal heirship is not allowed. In this case, the jury 
found, on convincing evidence, that appt was Prince's child. 
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Appee argues that there is no need to decide whether 
ftimble should be applied retroactively because Tx. Ct. App. de-
cided that appt would not be entitled to take under the current 
version of §42(b). Moreover, appt could have filed a common law 
paternity suit. But, in fact, appt made absolutely no effort to 
establish paternity prior to filing her heirship application. 
4. DISCUSSION: I doubt that this is a proper appeal. 
Appt bases jurisdiction on 28 u.s.c. §1257(2). The state court 
did not hold that the version of §42 in effect at the time of 
Prince's death was consistent with the Constitution~ rather, it 
declined retroactively to apply a decision of this Court. More-
~er, I doubt that appt argued that application of the statute to 
the facts of this case would be void under federal law~ rather, 
she probably argued that her equal protection rights prevented 
application of the statute to her. See Stern & Gressman §3.4 at 
162-164. Accordingly, I believe that the Court should follow 
appt's suggestion and treat her papers as a petition for cert. 
Appt does identify cases applying Trimble retroactively -::::::::.... 
under circumstances similar to those presented here. I think 
that the Court should decline to review the issue, notwithstand-
ing this conf 1 ict. Trimble was decided in 1977 so that the im-
portance of resolving the issue of its retroactivity does not 
seem pressing since cases raising the issue will no longer fre-
quently arise. Moreover, Texas has amended the version of §42 in 
effect at the time of Prince's death, and that version appears to 
------------~------------~--~-
comply with the Court's later pronouncements on methods of estab-
lishing paternity for purposes of intestate succes on. Lalli v. 
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Lalli, 439 u.s. 259 (1978) (upholding statute permitting inheri-
I ( '' tance from natural father only if court has declared paternity 
---~- - ---- --- ~ 
during father's life). 
~
And, Tx. Ct. App. stated that, even if 
amended §42(b) governed appt's claim, she would not be entitled 
to take because she did not satisfy any of the authorized forms 
of proof. 
Appt's second point troubles me because I do not under-
stand why Tx. Ct. App concluded that the jury's determination 
that she was Prince's child was an insufficient finding of pater-
nity. At first glance, the jury's decision seems equivalent to 
other judicial pronouncements of paternity. Tx. Ct. App. must 
have rejected that contention, but it simply fails to mention the 
point, with its entire discussion of her failure to satisfy 
amended §42(b) occupying one sentence. Appt's argument that she 
had no reasonable opportunity to establish paternity, as required 
by this Court's dec is ion in Pickett, is also troubling. Appt 
could have brought a common law paternity action, but such ac-
tions had limited statute of limitations. See Wynn v. Wynn, 587 
S • W. 2d 7 9 0 ( Tx . C t . App . ) • 
Nevertheless, I recommend that the Court deny review. 
( First the issues that appt seeks to raise are generally settled, 
..... __ 
and the Texas statutes have been amended to comport with this 
Court's decisio s. , the facts of the case, which appar--
ently were hotly contested, are very unattractive. For example, -----Tx. Ct. App. noted that some of appt's proof was based on 
Prince's "recognition" of her as his child. The court rejected 
the evidence because Prince, who was an alcoholic and non compis 
No. 85-755-ASX page 7. 
rrentis, had his moments of "recognition" during periods of "dete-
riorated mental condition." These circumstances suggest to me 
that the State does have a legitimate interest in having particu-
-----~ 
la methods ~-~~:r_ing_-R_~ni ty for purposes of heirship. 
Finally, appt's sex discrimination claim was not dis-
cussed by 'l'x. Ct. App. so that 1 am not sure that she pressed it 
there. Moreover, the claim is overstated. It is clear that the 
State does provide procedures by which an illegitimate can estab-
lish his right to take from his father, and those procedures seem 
consistent with Lalli v. Lalli, supra. Appt 's problem is that 
ilie procedures do not include a jury finding in the context of an 
heirship claim . .--------.. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: 1 recommend dismiss and deny. 
'!'here is a response. 
November 27, 1985 ~~ Opinion in petn 
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85-755 Reed v. Campbell, Individually, and as · 
Administratrix of the Estate of Prince 
Rupert Ricker, Deceased,(Texas Court of 
Appeals) 
MEMO TO ANNE: 
You recommended to the Conference that we D&D this 
case. You were so right! It is a mess, and nothing is 
very clear. As you observed, now that the case is here we 
should treat it as a cert petition. 
Simply to refresh my recollection, I will state the 
bare facts. Petitioner (with an extraordinary name!) was 
born November 1, 1958 when her mother and father were 
living together, but were not lawfully married. The case 
was tried to a jury, and it found that she was the child 
of Prince Richer (the deceased), but under Texas law is an 
illeg i tmate. Petititioner brought this suit against 
respondent as administratrix of her natural father's 
estate. Her father died intestate, leaving four 
legitimate children who also were defendants in this case. 
It is not entirely clear to me what Texas law 
provided at the relevant date. 
in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 u.s. 
Prior to my 1977 decision 
1l.1' ~ Section 42 of the 
2. 
Texas Probate Code provided that, while illegitimate ----~--------~----~- -~ 
children could inherit from their mother's, t~ey could not .,__. ·~ 
inherit from their fathe~~ unl~~s they were legitimatized --- ----
by a later marriage between their father and mother. In ---- ---
1977, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 u.s. 672, invalidated an 
Illinois statute that allowed illegitimates to take from 
their mother's but from their father's only if their 
parents later married each other and the father 
acknowledged the illegitimate as his child. 
Subsequent to Trimble, Texas amended Section 42 to 
provide that an illegitimate child could inherit from his 
father if (i) he was born or conceived before or during 
the marriage of his mother and father, 1 (ii) was 
' 
legitimatized · by a court decree: or (iii) his father 
executed a statement of paternity. 
In a proceedings to "to determine heirship" filed in 
February 1979, petitioner claimed entitlement to inherit 
from her father's estate. She also claimed that her 
mother and father, although not lawfully married, had 
established a "common law marriage". Responding to 
1 See p. A6 of Jurisdictional 
understand what this means. 
Statement. I don't 
3. 
(]) 
Special Issues, the j~ry foup9_in effect that there was no 
common law marriage, and that at the times she was 
-----~ 
conceived and bor~er father was married to a woman who 
was not her mother. 
-----~ - - As a result of the jury's finding 
that the petitioner was an illegitimate, a "take-nothing 
judgment" was rendered against respondent. Apparently the -- ~---------~--~~------~~~~ 
Texas court applied the version of Section 42 in effect at 
the time the father died on December 22, 1976. At that 
time Trimble was not decided, and apparently the Texas 
Court of Appeals applied Section 42 as it was in effect 
prior to Trimble: · namely, an illegitimate could not 
inherit unless legitimated by a later marriage between the 
father and mother. 
Petitioner correctly argues, I think, that Section 42 
in effect at the time of her father's death was clearly 
invalid under Trimble. The Texas Court of Appeals 
declined to apply Trimble retroactively. And apparently 
other courts have been divided as to its retroactivity. 
Petitioner argues that in any event the application of 
Section 42, as in effect at the time of her father's 
death, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
As noted above, Texas amended Section 42 following 
Ricker's death, and the amended Section 42 at least 
... 
4. 
arguably is consistent with our divided opinions in Lalli 
v. Lalli, 439 u.s. 259 {1978). In that case, we upheld a 
statute permitting inheritance from a natural father only 
if the father had made a declaration of paternity at 
sometime prior to his death. In this case, the father 
affirmatively insisted - apparently at all times - that 
petitioner was his daughter. There was, however, no --
formal declaration of paternity, and the Texas court noted 
that he was a hopeless alcoholic and non compis mentis 
most of the time. / f 
The opinion below and appellees' brief verge on being 
incomprehensible. I therefore am not sure as to exactly ,. 
the issue before us. If the Equal Protection issue were 
here { and I think this is doubtful), I would be inclined 
to hold that Trimble does apply retroactively. Thus, 
Section 42 was invalid. I assume this would require a 
reversal and remand. 
The appellees printed brief is 
~;. 
a great deal better, 
A 
and it makes some rather persuasive arguments. First, we 
are asked to DIG the case for several reasons. It is said 
that petitioner "lacks standing to assert the rights of 
third parties", an argument I do not understand. It is 
further stated that this Court would have to overturn 
5. 
findings of fact by the state court - findings that are 
fully supported by the record. In addition, it is argued 
that we would be required to construe state law. As much 
as I would like to forget this case, I am not sure that we 
should DIG it - having made the mistake of noting probable 
jurisdiction. 
With respect to the Equal Protection claim, counsel 
for appellee insists that state law determines the 
question of retroactivity, and that under Texas law 
Trimble can be applied prospectively only. This is a 
question I have not maturely considered, and would like 
Anne's view. My own intuitive reaction is that since 
Trimble was a constitutional decision, its retroactvity is 
a matter of federal law. 
While recognizing that I have not forced myself , to 
consider this unattractive case more carefully, I assume 
that we were prompted to grant it to determine the 
retroactivity of Trimble. If this is the primary question 
before us, as noted above I view it as one of federal law 
and would apply Trimble retroactively. 
Although I definitely do not want a long memo, ~ne, 
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May 1, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 85-755, Reed v. Campbell (appeal from Tx. Ct. App.) 
Some aspects of this case are difficult to resolve because 
the opinion of the lower court is not clear and because the 
briefing is not helpful. Appt, who is an illegitimate child, 
seeks to inherit from the estate of her natural father, who died 
" intestate. In essence, her claim is that she was denied an op-
- -- ~- -- __,-
..> 
portunity to establish paternity under various Texas statutes, a 
prerequisite to inheritance. Although the statutes have been 
amended several times in recent years to afford illegi timates 
broader opportunities to establish their right to inherit and to 
child support, appt appears to have fallen through the cracks; in 
~-------------------------------------------~ other words, each time a statute of limitations was extended, 
appt apparently was already outside of the limitations period. 
Briefly stated, the following represents my thinking concerning 
the issues raised by app't. 
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Retroactivity of Trimble v. Gordon, 430 u.s. 762 (1977). 
In Trimble, your opinion for the Court invalidated a pro-
vision of the Illinois Probate Code that provided that an ille-
gitimate could inherit from his father only if his parents mar-
ried and the father acknowledged the child as his child. Trimble 
held that the provision constituted a violation of equal protec-
tion because the classification did not bear a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state interest. 
The Texas statute in effect at the time of appt's father's 
death was virtually identical to that invalidated in Trimble. 
While the opinion of Tx. Ct. App. in this case is not crystal 
clear, the court rejected appt's argument that she was "entitled 
to inherit since to provide otherwise would be unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection" Clause. ~he court stated that 
Trimble "has not been applied retroactively where the father died 
before the case came down and suit was filed afterwards." One 
issue raised by appt here is whether the Tx. Ct. App. properly 
ruled that Trimble should not be applied retroactively. 
I recommend that you vote to reverse on this ground. 
Under principles of stare decisis, case law ordinarily does have 
some retroactive effect. This Court has recognized both in deci-
sions involving civil law and those involving criminal procedure 
that in some circumstances a "new" rule of law should not be ap-
plied retroactively. In the area of criminal procedure, you have 
endorsed Justice Harlan's view that a new rule should apply in 
f~ture cases~in ca~s pending o~ direct appeal when the deci-
sion announcing the new rule is handed down; the new rule should 
page 3. 
not, however, be applied on collateral attack of a criminal con-
viction. 
In the civil area, the governing test was set out in Chev-
~on Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 u.s. 97 (1972), and involves consider-
at ion "First, the decision to be ap-
plied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, 
either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may 
have relied, . or bydeciding an issue of first impression 
whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed •..• ~, it 
has been stressed that 'we must .•• weigh the merits and demer-
its in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in 
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective oper-
-· 
ation will further or retard its purpose ••. -~in~lly) we have 
weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for 
'[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial ineq-
uitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in 
our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding 
of nonretroactivity. '" Id., at 106-107. 
A good argument can be made that Trimble did not announce 
a new rule because the rule was foreshadowed in prior decisions. ~ 
(This determination is difficult, and I need to think further 
about it). Assuming that Trimble did announce a new principle of 
law, the other two factors, in my view, fully support retroactive 
application in the circumstances of this case. First, I want to 
emphasize that this case does not present a claim that Trimble 
should be applied retroactively to open a judgment in probate 
' 
finally determining the appropriate ~hares to be taken by claim-
page 4. 
ants to an estate. (That situation would resemble collateral 
attack on a final conviction, and I think that a strong argument 
can be made that Trimble should not be applied retroactively in 
~ an attack on a closed estate). Therefore, application of Trimble 
here would not upset orderly administration of probate. Just as 
judges ~rdin~rily should apply to a case pending before them ap-
plicable decisions ·· of this Court that are handed down while the 
case is pending, so I think that Trimble should be applied in an 
estate that is ending when Trimble was announced. (This situa-
tion more closely resembles a case pending on direct appeal when 
a new rule of criminal procedure is announced, than it does babe-
as corpus attack). Second, I see no inequity in applying Trimble 
here. At most the intestate heirs of appt's father had an expec-
tat ion that they might inherit from his estate. They had no 
vested property rights or reliance interests that would be upset 
by virtue of application of Trimble. Third, the purpose of 
Trimble to eliminate discrimination against illegitimates would 
be served by applying its rule in this case. 
Unfortunately, resolution of the Trimble issue does not 
necessarily dispose of this case. Appt assumes that, once the 
invalid portion of the probate code is set aside, she is entitled 
to take under the provisions generally applicable to legitimate 
intestate heirs. In my opinion, that assumption is unfounded 
because States do have an interest in ensuring that paternity 
claims are decided in a fair and orderly manner, and States 
therefore are entitled to enact statutes that prescribe certain 
evidentiary standards that illegitimate children must satisfy in 
page 5. 
order to be entitled to inherit. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 
u.s. 91 (1982) (Because of difficulty of proving paternity, "in 
support suits by illegitimate children more than in suits by le-
g i timate children, the State has an interest in preventing the 
prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims, and may impose greater 
restrictions on the former than it imposes on the latter. Such 
restrictions will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent 
they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.") 
For me, the question next becomes: once the invalid statute is ---set aside, what provision should govern appt's claim to inherit? --- ,.--..... ---- - ' ~ While refusing to apply Trimbl e here, TX. Ct. App. appears 
to have assumed that, if Trimble were applicable, appt' s claim 
would be governed by the 1979 version of §42 (b) of the Probate 
Code. Under that prcivl. sion I an illegitimate child can inherit 
from his father if the child is born or conceived before or dur-
ing his parents' marriage, if he is legitimized by court decree 
under Chapter 13 of the Family Code, or if his father has execut-
ed a statement of paternity under §13.22 of the Family Code. Tx. 
Ct. App. went on to say that . ~' , .[_e]ven if [appt] could claim under 
Section 42(b) as amen~ed, her exclusion under that statute does 
not deny her consti tution.al. equal protection .... since a rational 
state basis supports that legislation." Therefore, the court can 
be viewed as giving alternative holdings: (1) Trimble does not 
apply in this case; and (2) even if Trimble does apply, appt is 
barred from inheriting anyway because she does not satisfy the 
current version of §42(b). 
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Accordingly, the question finally becomes whether appt 
~ .... 
ever had an opportunity to satisfy §42 (b) • Her difficulty arose --- -from the fact that each time the Probate Code and Family Code 
were amended to liberalize the means by which illegitimates could 
establish paternity, the amended provisions apparently contained 
statutes of limitations that barred her from taking advantage of 
those means. This Court's precedents stand for the proposition 
that, once the State provides an opportunity for legitimate chil-
dren to inherit or obtain support, it must also grant that oppor-
tunity to illegitimate children. Moreover, that "opportunity" 
must be adequate. The Court has invalidated statutes that pro-
vided that suits to establish paternity must be brought within 
one year of the child's birth, Mills, supra, and within two years 
of birth, Pickett v. Brown, 462 u.s. 1 (1983). In the related 
context of actions for support, the Court has stated that "the 
period for obtaining paternal support has to be long enough to 
provide a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in 
illegitimate children to bring suit on their behalf; and any time 
limit on that opportunity has to be substantially related to the 
State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudu-
lent claims." Id., at 9. The remaining issue here, therefore, 
is to apply that analysis to Tex. Ct. App.'s denial of benefits 
to appt. 
Unfortunately, as noted above, the Texas laws governing 
illegitimates' inheritance rights have been amended several times 
in t~st se~ra:_ years, m~king it very difficult to be certain 
whether appt did have an adequate opportunity to establish her -----
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rights. Moreover, the parties dispute whether or not she had any 
such opportunity, and Tx. Ct. App. did not speak to the issue. 
My own conclusion is that the statutes, though now in compliance 
with this Court's precedents, did not afford appt such opportuni-
ty, though it appears that Texas may have recognized a common law 
paternity action. Since the principles governing this area are 
well settled, and since the underlying facts and Texas law appli-
cable to those facts are not clear, my view is that the Court 
should analyze the issue as follows. ~, the Court should 
hold that~ble applies in this case. ~, the Court should 
note that its precedents require that an illegitimate child be 
given a reasonable opportunity to establish her inheritance 
rights and that it appears that Texas law did not afford appt 
that opportunity.~, the Court should remand to Tx. Ct. App. 
for a determination of whether appt did have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to establish her rights. If she did have such an opportu-
ni ty but failed timely to pursue it, she should lose. If not, 
she should be entitled to such an opportunity now. 
Remaining Issues 
(1) Sex Discrimination. The thrust of this claim is that 
the Texas heirship statutes discriminate against mothers on the 
basis of their sex: appt argues that those laws burden surviving 
mothers because the illegitimate child is barred from heirship in 
his father's estate and, unlike surviving fathers, the mother is 
denied access to his estate to obtain support for the child. The 
Court should decline to consider the claim. At oral argument, 
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counsel for appt conceded that this claim was an alternative to 
his Trimble claim; counsel agreed that if he prevailed on the 
Trimble claim, there would be no need for the Court to reach his 
sex discrimination claim. 
(2) L~ Issues. Appt raises additional claims 
relating to Chapter 13 of th e Family Code, which provides a pro-
cedure through which an illegitimate child may obtain a paternity 
decree. At oral argument, counsel for appt stated that this 
category of claims was substantial because it was important for 
appt to achieve the status of "legitimate" child rather than 
being stigmatized as an "illegitimate" child and to obtain attor-
ney 1 s fees. To the extent that appt 1 s claims to legitimation are 
independent from her claim to inherit, I think that the Court 
should decline to reach the legitimation issues. (The issues 
overlap because Chapter 13 provides one means by which an ille-
gitimate can establish inheritance rights; therefore, in decid-
ing if appt had a reasonable opportunity to establish such 
rights, it will be necessary to consider the effect of Chapter 
13.) Even if the legitimation claims were presented to the lower 
court as issues separate from the inheritance claim, that court 
did not expressly pass on them. I think that in the lower 
courts, the thrust of appt 1 s position was her claim to inheri-
tance; moreover, she did at one point claim that her father 1 s 
estate owed her child support. My review of the joint appendix 
suggests that petr never did argue that the "status" of being a 
legitimate child was independently important to her; rather, she 
wanted to establish that she was her father 1 s daughter so that 
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she could obtain some of his money. Moreover, the opinion of Tx. 
Ct. App. does not reflect any argument concerning appt's desire 
to achieve the status of a legitimate child or concerning the 
constitutionality of the legitimation provisions. Rather, ·the 
opinion discusses only claims relating to the Probate Court's 
denial of inheritance rights. Under these circumstances, I think 
that the Court can exercise its discretion and decline to consid-
er these claims. 
(3) Finally, I think that the case is a candidate for a 
DIG. Apart from the issue of whether Trimble applies retroac-..__--.., 
tively, the standards governing the claims in this case are well 
settled. Moreover, since Trimble was decided several years ago, 
the question of its retroactivity is unlikely to be of recurring 
importance. As we have discussed, the briefing was unhelpful, 
the issues in the case are not presented with clarity, the opin-
ion of the lower court is murky, and the facts are hotly disputed 
and very unattractive. The fact that the decision would settle 
the Trimble question points in favor of deciding that question. 
But I doubt that the decision will be of much importance to any-
one but these parties. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-755 
DEL YNDA ANN RICKER BARKER 
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JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Prince Ricker, appellant's father, died intestate on Decem-
ber 22, 1976. At that time, § 38 of the Texas Probate Code 
provided that a decedent's estate should descend to "his chil-
dren and their descendants," 1 but § 42 prohibited an illegiti-
mate child from inheriting from her father unless her parents 
had subsequently married. 2 In T_r~v. Gordon, 430 
U. S. 762 (1977)-decided four montlls after Ricker's death-
we held that a total statutory disinheritance, from the 
paternal estate, of children born out of wedlock and not 
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents is 
unconstitutional. In this case, the Texas Court of Appeals 
held that § 42 of the Texas probate code nevertheless pre-
'See Texas Probate Code § 38 (Vernon 1980) ("Where any person having 
title to any estate, .. . shall die intestate, leaving no husband or wife, it 
shall descend and pass in parcenary to his kindred, male and female, in the 
following course: 1. To his children and their descendants . .. "). 
2 See Texas Probate Code § 42 (1955) ("For the purpose of inheritance 
to, through, and from an illegitimate child, such child shall be treated the 
same as if he were the legitimate child of his mother, so that he and his 
issue shall inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred, both 
descendants , ascendants, and collaterals in all degress, and they may in-




2 REED v. CAMPBELL 
vented appellant from sharing in her father's estate because 
Trimble does not apply retroactively. 3 The Texas Supreme 
Court refuse appe ant's a p ca 1on of error, noting "no re-
versible error." We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S. 
-- (1985), and now reverse. 
I 
Only a few facts need be stated. In November of 1957, 
Prince Ricker and appellant's mother participated in a cere-
monial marriage, but it was invalid because Ricker's divorce 
from his first wife was not final. Appellant was born a year 
later. Ricker was lawfully married three times, once before 
and twice after his liaison with appellant's mother. He was 
survived by five legitimate children (two from his first and 
three from his third marriage) and by appellant. 
Shortly after Ricker's death in 1976, his oldest daughter 
was appointed administratrix of his estate. The estate was 
still open in Februa of 978, when appellant formally noti-
fied the adm1mstratrix and the probate court of her claim to a 
one-sixth share of the estate. ,JRAdue course, she filed a for-
mal compl~t; a ~Y.iOJ!.nd tl{ai)Ricker was her father but 
that he w~ever validly married to her mother; and the trial 
court denied her claim. 
In the Court of Appeals, appellant contended that she was 
entitled to inherit even if she was illegitimate because § 42 
was unconstitutional, and also that she was entitled to be le-
gitimated on various theories. The appellate court rejected 
all her arguments. 4 
v--
3 "Under the rule of Winn v. Lackey, [618 S. W. 2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1981)] and the out-of-state cases cited therein, the equal protection argu-
ment fails as Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 (1977), has not been applied 
retroactively where the father died before the case came down and suit was 
filed afterwards." 682 S. W. 2d 697, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). 
• In her jurisdictional statement, appellant raised several questions that 
relate to the legitimation issue. Because we hold that she is entitled to 
relief on her principal claim, and because the legitimation questions appear 
not to have been properly presented as federal questions, see Appellant's 
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II 
Although the question presented in this case is framed in 
terms of "retroactivity," its answer is overned by a rather 
clear distinction that has emerge from our cases cons1 ering 
thecons 1tutwnality of ~a~~ns that impo~ spe-
c.ial burdens on illegfflmate chiJdren-:- - In these cases, we 
haveu:namoiguously ~hat a State may not justify 
discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in order to express 
its disapproval of their parents' misconduct. 5 We have, 
however, also recognized that there is a permissible basis for 
some "distinctions made in part on the basis of legitimacy;" 6 
specifically, we have uQ!:teld statutory provisions that have an 
evident and substantial relation to e tate's interest in pro-
viding fOrtheoraerl an just i tri utw o a ecedent's 
property at d~La tv. La li, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 7 - --
Brief before the Texas Court of Appeals (presenting only the Trimble 
question as a federal constitutional tssue), we do not reach the legitimation 
issue. 
5 "It is true, of 90urse, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however de-
fined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes 
not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation 
to the individual's abjlity to participate in and contribute to society. The 
Court recognized in 'Weber [v. Aetna Casualty, 406 U. S. 164 (1972)] that 
visiting condemnation upon he child in order to express society's disap-
proVafof the paren iaisons 
"'is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegiti-
mate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. 
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegiti-
mate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the 
parent.' 406 U. S., at 175. (Footnote omitted.)" 
Mathews v. Lucas , 427 U. S. 495, 505 (1976). 
6 Ibid. 
7 "The presence in this case of the State's interest in the orderly dispo-
sition of a decedent's property at death distinguishes it from others in 
which that justification for an illegitimacy-based classification was absent. 
E . g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); Gomez v. Perez, 409 
U. S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 
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The state interest in the orderly disposition of decedents' 
estates may justify the imposition of special requirements 
upon an illegitimate child who asserts a right to inherit from 
her father, and, of course, it justifies the enforcement of 
generally applicable limitations on the time and the manner 
in which claims may be asserted. After an estate has been 
finally distributed, the interest in finality may provide an 
additional, valid justification for barring the belated assertion 
of claims, even though they may be meritorious and even 
though mistakes of law or fact may have occurred during the 
probate process. We find no such justification for the 
State's rejection of appe1tant s claim~ 
The "-Texas ourts ave re 1e on Trimble v. Gordon, 
supra, as a basis for holding § 42 of the 1955 probate code 
invalid in cases that were pendin,g on April 26, 1977-the 
date Trimble was decided. SeeWinn v. Lackey, 618 S. W. 
2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); ravejoy v. Lillie, 569 S. W. 2d 
501 (Texas Civ. App. 1978). Although the administration of 
Prince Ricker's estate was in progress on that date, the court 
refused to apply Trimble because appellant's claim was not 
asserted until later. Thus, the test applied by the Texas 
Court resulted in the denial of appellant's claim because of 
the conjunction of two facts: (1) her father died before April 
26, 1977, and (2) her claim was filed after April 26, 1977. 
There is nothing in the record to explain why these two 
facts, either separately or in combination, should have pre-
vented the applicability of Trimble, and the allowance of ap-
pellant's claim, at the time when the trial court was required 
170 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968). " (Opinion of POWELL, 
• J. ). 439 U. S. at 268, n. 6. 
Although the dissenters did not believe the state interest was sufficient to 
support the particular statute before the Court in that case, they agreed 
with the basic proposition that this state interest may justify some 
differential treatment-"N ew York might require illegitimates to prove 
paternity by an elevated standard of proof," id. , at 279 (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting). 
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to make a decision. At that time, the governing law had 
been established: Trimble had been decided, and it was clear 
that § 42 was invalid. The state interest in the orderly 
administration of Prince Ricker's estate would have been 
served equally well regardless of how the merits of the claim 
were resolved. In this case, then, neither the date of his 
death nor the date the claim was filed had any impact on the 
relevant state interest in orderly administration; their con-
junction similarly had no impact on that state interest. 
The interest in equal treatment protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution-more specifically, 
the interest in avoiding unjustified discrimination against 
children born out of wedlock, see Mathews v. Lucas, supra, 
at 505---should therefore have been given controlling effect. 
That interest requires that appellant's claim to a share in her 
father's estate be protected by the full applicability of 
Trimble to her claim. 8 
The judgment of the Texas Court of Appeals is therefore 
reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
8 In addition to concluding that Trimble did not apply, the Texas Court 
of Appeals stated, "even if the plaintiff could claim under section 42(b) as 
amended, her exclusion from the inheritance under that statute does not 
deny her constitutional equal protection since a rational state basis sup-
ports that legislation." 682 S. W. 2d, at 700. We read that statement, 
not as an alternative ground for the court's judgment, but as the rejection 
of an alternative ground for appellant's recovery. To read it as assuming 
that the amended statute defeated appellant's claim, even if Trimble ap-
plied, would, in the context of this case and the amended statute's require-
ments, raise serious due process questions. 
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